The Rules of the Game

One of the predominant works on cooperative game theory comes from Robert Axelrod’s, The Evolution of Cooperation. In a simple computer contest, Axelrod pits independently developed cooperative strategies in iterations of Prisoner Dilemma interactions. This simple competition revealed the basic necessities for cooperation, more specifically reciprocal altruism, to exist:

1. Recognize individuals
2. Remember the individual’s last move
3. Be able to retaliate if that individual cheats
4. Repeat interactions

The assumptions of the game are that each individual is seeking some gain, measured in points in the contest, and can retaliate, by refusal of points by the cheated to the cheater. This model meshes very well with several practical examples of cooperation from the simplest interactions of independent cells to the complex geo-political interactions of the day. It is a formative work in the understanding of how cooperation meshes with an evolutionary theory that at first glance would suggest evolution would only breed life forms that are solely out for their own good. On the contrary, the model shows that evolution perpetuates cooperation because in most instances it increases the ability of the living things involved to perpetuate their genetic code (a living thing’s main objective) better than living things only out for their own good. It also explains how not all living things need to be engaged directly in the act of reproduction so long as their existence provides some benefit, no matter how peripheral, to a relative which does reproduce.

This model also meshes with international politics. Consider the most recent struggle between Hezbollah and Israel. At a point in the battle, Israel and Hezbollah reached an agreement for ceasefire to be enacted at a certain date, not immediately. Consistent with the model, Hezbollah launched a barrage of rockets just before the deadline because they knew Israel would not have enough time to retaliate. This is a classical exampled of a common sense idea, get the last jab in. This also seems to be the guiding philosophy which keeps our troops from withdrawal in Iraq.

Bush said if U.S. forces withdraw from Iraq, insurgents would "use the vacuum created by an American retreat to gain control of a country, a base from which to launch attacks and conduct their war against nonradical Muslim governments."

However, our situation in Iraq is not the same as Hezbollah and Israel or the Prisoner Dilemma. Iraq is for all intensive purposes an independent nation to which we are providing military support. They have their own military and police which would remain if American troops were redeployed out of the country. If the objective of our military presence is to make “sure al-Qaida doesn't get a foothold in Iraq” as President Bush states, then the long term consideration of the capabilities of that state must be considered.

“Success also means making sure al-Qaida doesn't get a foothold in Iraq, which they're trying to do in Anbar province. So success is measurable; it's definable; and last year was a year in which there was a setback to success.”

Unless the plan is keep American troops in Iraq indefinitely, Iraqi police and military MUST establish the capacity to prevent al Qaida from gaining that foothold. If that capability is developed, then there is no opportunity for al Qaida to get the last hit in because the Iraqi military and police can retaliate in place of US troops. Being hesitant to remove troops indicates that the US strategists do not believe that Iraq has developed this capability.

Axelrod’s model also tells us that Iraq will likely not develop this capability so long as the US military is unconditionally committed to stay. The US is currently in a tight spot in Iraq, because they cannot punish the Iraqi government for not developing this capability. By doing anything that would damage the government of Iraq, retaliatory act, may open a breach in Iraq’s capabilities in which the foothold can be established. Removing US troops is equivalent to this retaliatory act upon the government since we can assume that the terrorist threat is constant against the government of Iraq. Raising an army in a war torn country is nearly impossible, particularly if you are a fledgling government trying to revive the apparatus of a government obliterated by years of continuous warfare. There is little incentive for Iraq to throw resources in the development of their military and police so long as the perception of US involvement is unconditional.

Another big risk of continued involvement in Iraq is a terrorist possum play. This game is the perception that our current military involvement is having a permanent affect on terrorist involvement on Iraq. If terrorists act as if they were affected by the US military presence and reduce their attacks before Iraqi capabilities are fully up to par the US may pull out believing they have won, leaving Iraq open for attack. If this occurs, Iraq will be devastated by terrorist attacks and the US military will be strained to return. If any lesson should have been learned in the US involvement with the tactic of terrorism, it should be that terrorism CANNOT be defeated by a temporary tactical maneuver. Terrorism is a long term strategy.

The Fix

Most of US debate about US troop levels in Iraq revolves around removing troops from Iraq, but this is inverse of what needs to be discussed. Iraq requires the capability to stave off terrorism, therefore the discussion should revolve around getting Iraq these capabilities and pulling out once those tactical capabilities are established. Current military strategy is terribly flawed if the fundamental assumption is that a temporary military attack will permanently affect terrorist activities. Terrorism is a long term engagement, and all US plans must be revolve around the concept that the capability to retaliate against terrorism must be continuous. For Iraq this means we must focus on developing Iraq’s military and police capability as rapidly and effectively as possible. It is my belief that Iraq wants to be fully independent but is hindered by the continued fighting. A way to achieve a cooperative relationship with Iraq to get them to establish a capable military and police is to establish a reward system. A reward system is the logic we use every day when we work; if I work for two weeks, you agree to pay me. If I don’t work for that time, you can retaliate by not paying me, or if you don’t pay me even though I worked, I don’t have to work for you again. This can be applied to Iraq by establishing a reward system in which they are rewarded for achieving tactical capabilities by being given military and police infrastructure support they could not otherwise achieved on their own. Achieving these milestones should result in rewards which increase Iraq’s military infrastructure that would be difficult for them to achieve otherwise. For example, if they meet certain troop readiness numbers by a certain date, they get a specific number of attack helicopters, pilot training for those helicopters, and maintenance training. Missing this objective would result in a lesser reward to no reward at all. This technique is used in military and construction contracting and has been proven effective because it allows a retaliatory mechanism without truly damaging either party. From my limited perspective the fastest and seemingly most effective way to get out is to do the following:

1. Establish a tactical capability objective for the Iraqi military and police to have to sufficiently repel a terrorist attack. Figure out what it would take for the Iraqi military and police to repel al Qaeda independently.
2. Establish a reasonable timeline to achieve these capabilities.
3. Establish milestones for the Iraqi military to hit to get to that final objective.
4. Reward milestone achievement with rewards that Iraq could not otherwise achieve on their own—helicopters, for example.
5. Provide full infrastructure support. The US should provide as much support as practically possible to build the Iraqi military infrastructure including such activities as taking troops, and perhaps their families, out of the country to train.

Putting this system in place would mean that the schedule could also be made public because they are increasing the capability to defeat terrorist, and therefore, their achievement would be demoralizing to them while uplifting to Iraqi and US troops.